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Abstract
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous charac-
teristics. We experimentally investigate the emergence and informal enforcement of dierent
contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous groups and in groups that are heteroge-
neous with regard to endowments and marginal benets from the public good. When punish-
ment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions
increase and strongly dier across groups and individuals with dierent induced character-
istics. We show econometrically that these dierences are not accidentally but enforced by
punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding
the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with dierent characteristics
tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payo dierences. Our
results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution
norms in an important way.
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The need for cooperation among people with heterogeneous characteristics is an undeniable
fact of social and economic life. At the work place, teams are composed of workers who may
dier in their productivity, ability, and motivation (Hamilton et al., 2003). Irrigation systems
are often jointly used and maintained by farmers with dierent plot sizes and water needs.1
People also can derive very dierent benets from public goods. For example, the elevation of
dams along the Mississippi river gives very dierent benets to individuals who live close to
the river compared to those who live further away. In the international political and economic
arena, countries that greatly dier in size and wealth are often confronted with situations that
require them to nd joint agreements in order to overcome social dilemmas. Sandler and Hartley
(2001) discuss this problem in the framework of international military alliances. Other prominent
examples of international cooperation include the Kyoto protocol that aims to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, shing quotas for European Union members to mitigate the over-shing of open
waters, and the Global Disease Detection Program spearheaded by the United States that seeks
early detection of infectious diseases.
As diverse as the above examples seem, they can all be viewed as special cases of a more
general public goods problem where the enforcement of cooperation by third-parties is infeasible
or very limited (e.g., due to the actions of others being unobservable or as the result of the lack
of a supranational institution with coercive power). In such situations, cooperation has to be
promoted through other mechanisms, such as informally enforced social norms (Elster, 1989;
Coleman, 1990).2 The importance of social norms for sustaining cooperative behavior in public
goods environments has been demonstrated in a number of controlled laboratory experiments
(for recent reviews see, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; G achter and Herrmann, 2009). However, this
experimental evidence is based on homogeneous-group environments, and therefore, neglects the
important fact that people dier. This is a potentially serious shortcoming because people who
dier may also adhere to dierent norms, which may lead to conicts and ineciencies. In this
paper, we experimentally investigate the emergence and informal enforcement of contribution
1For instance, in the western states of the United States, family farms dependent on irrigation vary in annual
farm sales from below $100,000 to above $500,000 (U.S.D.A., 2004).
2Social norms are a widespread empirical phenomenon (Becker, 1996; Hechter and Opp, 2001; Posner, 2002).
Numerous examples of the impact of norms on behavior have been meticulously documented (e.g., Roethlisberger
and Dickson, 1947; Whyte, 1955; Hywel, 1985; Sober and Wilson, 1997; Gurven, 2004). For examples of the role
of norms in the use of common resources see Ostrom (1990).
1norms in the presence of heterogeneity.
Since the seminal paper of Fehr and G achter (2000), a stream of studies have contributed
to our understanding of the informal enforcement of `voluntary' contributions in public good
games with homogeneous groups. In homogeneous groups, people generally sanction those who
contribute less than they do (and sometimes also those who contribute more). This behavior
is consistent with the enforcement of a norm that prescribes equal contributions by all group
members and is often successful in supporting relatively high levels of cooperation.3 Given the
symmetry between individuals in homogenous groups an equal-contributions norm is intuitively
appealing and is in concordance with important general fairness principles: equality and equity
(Konow, 2003).4
In heterogeneous groups it is much less obvious what contribution norm may emerge, if
one emerges at all. Dierent and probably conicting notions of fairness may be invoked by
dierent people depending on their characteristics. If, for instance, people dier in their income,
a norm of equal contributions may be appealing to those with more resources and a norm
based on contributions proportional to income may be preferred by those with less resources.
Similarly, if people are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for the public good (or
their productivity in producing it), equal contributions may be preferred by those who derive a
lot of pleasure from the provision of the public good whereas those who enjoy the public good
less may prefer a norm with asymmetric contributions. In contrast to homogeneous groups, the
experimental evidence regarding contributions to public goods in heterogeneous groups is much
less conclusive,5 and evidence on the enforcement of contribution norms in heterogeneous groups
3The success of informal sanctioning in supporting cooperative behavior has been shown to depend on the
costs and eectiveness of the sanctioning (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2008;
Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Sutter et al., 2008), the possibility of taking revenge
(Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008), availability of information (Carpenter, 2007), communication
opportunities (Bochet et al., 2006), and cultural factors (Herrmann et al., 2008).
4Equality and equity considerations are commonly called upon in normative research and have been extensively
discussed by numerous philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, 1925; Rawls, 1971; Corlett, 2003). Equality is also commonly
invoked in social choice theory as axioms of symmetry and anonymity (e.g., Moulin, 1991; Gaertner, 2006).
5Experiments investigating endowment heterogeneity report mixed results. Ostrom et al. (1994), van Dijk et al.
(2002), and Cherry et al. (2005) nd that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al. (1996) and Buckley
and Croson (2006) report a positive eect, and Chan et al. (1999) and Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) no eect. With
respect to heterogeneity in the marginal benet from the public good, Fisher et al. (1995) nd that individuals
with a high marginal benet contribute more than those with a low marginal benet.
2is basically absent.6
In this paper we provide experimental evidence for the emergence and informal enforcement
of dierent contribution norms in a repeated linear public good game when people dier in either
their endowment or their preference for the public good. In total, we implement eight treatments
consisting of four dierent heterogeneity conditions, each with and without punishment possi-
bilities. In the unequal endowment treatments, heterogeneity is introduced by providing one
person (out of three) with an endowment that is twice as high as the endowment of the other
group members. To control for the eect of the extended contribution possibilities due to a larger
endowment, we restrict the contribution possibilities to be the same for all group members in
one pair of treatments, whereas in another pair we allow for contributions up to the entire en-
dowment. In a third treatment pair, we keep endowments the same for all group members but
induce a 50 percent higher marginal benet from the public good for one of the three group
members. As control treatments, we also examine behavior in homogeneous groups (with and
without punishment). Our design allows us to isolate the eect of unequal endowments, unequal
contribution possibilities, and unequal preferences for the public good on contribution behavior
as well as their interaction with sanctioning possibilities within one experimental setting.
We nd that without punishment possibilities, heterogeneity does not matter much. In all
treatments free-riding is relatively frequent and steadily increases over time. In other words,
we do not nd evidence for a contribution norm other than free-riding to emerge. In the treat-
ments with punishment the picture changes drastically. In both homogeneous and heterogeneous
groups, contributions are much higher with punishment than without punishment and they do not
decrease over time. More importantly, the contribution pattern diers strongly across treatments.
In the treatment with unequal endowments and unrestricted contribution possibilities, contribu-
tions are proportional to endowments. Similarly, in the treatment with unequal marginal benets
from the public good, contributions are almost perfectly proportional to the ratio of marginal
benets. In contrast, in the treatment with constrained contribution possibilities, group mem-
bers with large endowments do not contribute more than other group members despite the fact
6To our knowledge, the only experiment that combines endowment heterogeneity and punishment possibilities
is Visser and Burns (2006). They report that among South African shermen punishment eectively promotes
cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Reuben and Riedl (2009) show that in privileged
groups|that is, groups in which one player has a dominant strategy to contribute a positive amount|punishment
does not promote contributions as eectively as in homogeneous groups. Tan (2008) nds a similar result for non-
privileged heterogeneous groups and Noussair and Tan (2009) report that voting on punishment is not eectively
increasing contributions in such groups.
3that their endowment is twice as large. We show econometrically that contributions do not dier
accidently, but are the result of informal enforcement of dierent contribution norms in the dif-
ferent treatments. Interestingly, irrespective of dierences in endowments and marginal benets
from the public good, individuals within a group largely agree on which contribution norm to
enforce|even when the norm implies that some individuals benet relatively more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedures. Section 3 discusses dierent focal and potentially conicting contribution norms,
given the heterogeneity among group members. Section 4 reports the contribution rates of the
dierent treatments and presents the results regarding the enforcement of dierent contribution
norms. Section 5 concludes and discusses our results.
2 Experimental Design
The basic game implemented in the experiment is a linear public good game that is played by
the same group of three subjects for ten consecutive periods. The game consists of a contribution
stage in which each subject i receives an endowment of yi points. Subjects simultaneously decide
how many points, ci, they want to contribute to the public good, where ci 2 [0; ci] and  ci is person
i's maximum contribution. Every point contributed to the public good by any group member
increases i's earnings by i points and every point not contributed by i increases i's earnings by
one point. If i < 1 for all i and
P
i i > 1, then each point contributed increases the sum of
earnings in the group but decreases the earnings of the contributing subject, creating a tension
between individual and group interest. Subject i's earnings at the end of the contribution stage
are given by
i = yi   ci + i
X
j
cj:
Each subject takes part in one of eight treatments, which vary along two dimensions: (i)
the degree of heterogeneity in endowments and marginal benets from the public good, and (ii)
whether or not they have the option to punish other group members (see Fehr and G achter,
2000).
Two treatments correspond to the standard public good game with homogeneous groups
played with and without punishment, respectively. In these treatments, each group member i
has the same endowment yi = 20 points, and receives the same marginal benet from the public
good i = 0:50. We call these treatments Equal (see Table 1). In the remaining six treatments,
groups are heterogeneous: group members dier either in their endowment or in their marginal
4Table 1: Experimental treatments
Group
type
Subject's
type
yi i  ci
Number of groups
without/with punishment
Equal low 20 points 0.50 20 points 7 / 6
URE
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
7 / 7
high 40 points 0.50 20 points
UUE
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
6 / 6
high 40 points 0.50 40 points
UMB
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
7 / 6
high 20 points 0.75 20 points
benet from the public good. Specically, in each group one member receives either a higher
endowment or a higher marginal benet from the public good than the other two group members.
For convenience we refer to the former as the high type and to the latter as the low type.7
In two treatments, high types receive an endowment of yH = 40 points whereas low types get
yL = 20 points. Importantly, in these treatments contributions of both high and low types are
restricted to a maximum of 20 points. We refer to these as the unequal-restricted-endowments
treatments or URE. In two further treatments, high types again receive yH = 40 points and
low types yL = 20 points. However, in contrast to URE the contributions of high types are
unrestricted (i.e.,  cH = 40 points). We refer to these treatments as the unequal-unrestricted-
endowments treatments or UUE. In the nal two treatments, both types receive the same en-
dowment of 20 points but high types earn a marginal benet from the public good equal to
H = 0:75 while low types earn L = 0:50. Correspondingly, we refer to them as the unequal-
marginal-benet treatments or UMB. The eight treatments are summarized in Table 1 along
with the number of independent groups in each.
As mentioned, in half of the treatments subjects do not have the option of punishing other
group members. In these treatments, subjects' earnings at the end of a period correspond to their
earnings after the contribution stage (see above). In the remaining half, subjects can punish each
other as in Fehr and G achter (2002). In these treatments, the contribution stage is followed by
a punishment stage, in which each individual is informed of the contributions of the other group
7In each group, subjects are randomly assigned to high and low types at the beginning of the experiment, and
they stay in their role throughout the ten periods. This procedure is known to all participants.
5members.8 Each subject i simultaneously decides how many punishment points, pij 2 [0;10], to
assign to each subject j 6= i in the group. Each punishment point costs the punisher one point
and reduces the earnings of the punished subject by three points.9 After the punishment stage,
subjects are informed of the total number of punishment points assigned to them. As in Fehr
and G achter (2000, 2002), subjects do not receive specic information concerning who punished
whom. In the treatments with punishment, at the end of a period, earnings of a subject i are
given by10
i = yi   ci + i
X
j
cj   3
X
j6=i
pji  
X
j6=i
pij:
Treatments Equal and URE dier only in the higher endowment of one group member.
Thus, comparing these treatments allows us to isolate the eect of endowment heterogeneity
on contributions and punishment behavior of both high and low types. Due to the restriction
on the contributions of high types in URE, we can be sure that any dierences in behavior
are solely driven by the fact that high types possess a high endowment and not because they
can contribute more to the public good. The eect of higher contribution possibilities can
be examined by comparing URE with UUE. Finally, comparing Equal with UMB allows us to
investigate the eect of dierences in the marginal benets from the public good on contributions
and punishment for given equal endowments.
Experimental Procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted in the CREED laboratory of the University of Am-
sterdam using the typical procedures of anonymity, neutrally-worded instructions, and monetary
incentives. In total, 156 subjects participated in the one-hour long experiment. About half of the
8Subjects know the values of yi, i,  ci of all group members. Hence, they can identify the contribution of high
and low types.
9In line with Fehr and G achter (2000) and others, we impose an upper limit on the amount of punishment i
can assign to each j. The reason for this restriction is to prevent subjects with higher earnings from having the
capability to punish more than subjects with lower earnings (as punishment is funded through their own earnings).
On the other hand, one might reason that the low types acting together have twice the power of high types, which
they could use to force them to contribute considerably more. However, as can be seen below, we do not nd
support for such an over-exploitation hypothesis.
10To avoid subjects making losses during the experiment solely by the actions of others, if punished below zero
points a subject i earns: i = max[0;yi   ci + i
P
j cj   3
P
j6=i pji]  
P
j6=i pij. Subjects may accept to incur a
loss through the punishment points they deal out, in case they have less than twenty points after the contribution
stage (Fehr and G achter, 2000).
6subjects were female. Also, around half were students of economics (the other half came from
other elds such as biology, engineering, political science, and law). Average earnings equaled
e13.45 (US$17.50).
After arrival in the lab's reception room, each subject drew a card to be randomly assigned
to a seat in the laboratory. Once everyone was seated, the instructions for the experiment were
read aloud (a translation of the instructions, which are originally in Dutch, can be found in the
online appendix at http://www.ereuben.net/). Thereafter, subjects answered a few questions
to ensure their understanding of the instructions. When all subjects had correctly answered
the questions, the computerized experiment (programmed with z-Tree, Fischbacher, 2007) was
started. After the ten periods, subjects had to answer a short debrieng questionnaire and were
condentially paid their earnings in cash.
3 Focal and Conicting Contribution Norms
If all subjects are rational and maximize solely their monetary earnings, all individuals in all
treatments are predicted to not contribute to the public good. However, previous experimental
evidence from homogeneous groups suggests that: (i) without punishment there is some initial
cooperation that decreases to low levels over time (Ledyard, 1995), and (ii) with punishment,
sanctions are used to enforce high contribution levels that do not decline with repetition (Fehr
and G achter, 2000; G achter and Herrmann, 2009).11
Our main interest is the possible emergence of contribution norms in homogeneous groups
and in dierent types of heterogeneous groups. In homogeneous groups, where all group members
are symmetric at the outset and equal contributions imply equal earnings, it is natural to think
that the ensuing contribution norm is one in which everyone contributes an equal amount. In
this respect, it is interesting to note that many researchers implicitly assume such an equal-
contributions norm when they analyze punishment behavior in public good games. For example,
it is commonly assumed that punishment is motivated by deviations from either the average
contribution (Fehr and G achter, 2000, 2002; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Sefton et al., 2007),
the punisher's contribution (Herrmann et al., 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Sutter et al., 2008), or
11Models of social preferences have been proposed to explain these deviations from standard economic theory
(for a review see, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). For the treatments without punishment these models predict low
contribution levels in all treatments. For the treatments with punishment they predict a large number of equilibria,
including some with high contribution levels (see e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
7Table 2: Focal contribution norms
Note: Contribution norms implied by the fairness concepts of equality and equity applied to
both contributions and earnings. Equity can be interpreted as proportionality with respect to
endowments or to marginal benets (y or ), or proportionality with respect to the capacity to
contribute ( c).
Equality
Equity to Equity to
Equality
Equity to Equity to
y or   c y or   c
applied to contributions applied to earnings
Equal ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj
URE cH = cL cH = 2cL cH = cL cH = 20;cL = 0 cH = 2
3cL cH = 20;cL = 0
UUE cH = cL cH = 2cL cH = 2cL cH = 20 + cL cH = 2
3cL cH = 2
3cL
UMB cH = cL cH = 3
2cL cH = cL cH = 2cL cH = 3
4cL cH = 2cL
both (Masclet et al., 2003; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008). In all these cases an
equal-contributions norm is assumed.12 In heterogeneous groups, it is much less obvious what
the contribution norm would be.
The literature on fair allocation rules provides two prominent fairness concepts that can be
used to predict the contribution norms that might emerge in heterogeneous groups: equality and
equity (Konow, 2003; Konow et al., 2009). Equality is generally thought of as the equalization
of output or outcomes with no necessary link to individual input or capacity. In contrast,
equity is mostly interpreted as the dependence of fair outcomes|in a proportional way|on
individual eort or ability. In Table 2 we summarize the contribution norms implied by the
various interpretations of these two fairness concepts in the framework of our experiment. In the
following paragraphs we discuss them in turn.
If subjects interpret equality as equality in contributions, then it trivially follows that the
equal-contributions norm will emerge in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (i.e., ev-
eryone contributes equal amounts irrespective of dierences in endowments or marginal benets).
Alternatively, if subjects apply the concept of equity, then contributions ought to be proportional.
For example, in UUE proportionality implies a contribution norm in which high types contribute
12A notable exception to the common assumption of an equal-contributions norm in homogeneous groups is
Carpenter and Matthews (2008). They explicitly look for dierent contribution norms and nd, in a setting
with incomplete information and in-group and out-group punishment possibilities, that the decision to punish is
triggered by deviations from almost full contributions, and that the amount of punishment depends on deviations
from contribution rates of 36 percent.
8twice as much as low types. In the other heterogeneous treatments, however, it is possible to
have conicting interpretations of proportionality. In URE, on the one hand, proportionality can
be related to unequal endowments, in which case high types should contribute twice the amount
of low types. On the other hand, consistent with Major and Deaux (1982), proportionality can
be applied to the equal capacity to contribute, which implies that both types should contribute
the same. In UMB, contributions proportional to marginal benets entail a contribution norm
in which high types contribute 50 percent more than low types, whereas proportionality with
respect to the capacity to contribute translates into equal contributions for both types. In light of
the evidence that individuals often resort to fairness concepts in a self-serving manner (Babcock
and Loewenstein, 1997), the multiple possible interpretations of proportionality allow low and
high types to subscribe to focal but conicting contribution norms.
If subjects interpret equality as equality in earnings (as argued by Dawes et al., 2007), then
in both URE and UUE, high types should contribute 20 points more than low types, which in
URE implies that low types do not contribute at all. In UMB equality in earnings means that
high types contribute twice as much as low types. Applied to earnings, the concept of equity|in
the sense of maintaining proportionality to endowments or marginal benets from the public
good|is somewhat counterintuitive. It implies that low types ought to contribute more than
high types: 50 percent more in URE and UUE and 33 percent more in UMB. Proportionality
of earnings to the capacity to contribute implies again that low types ought to contribute more
than high types in UUE, but has the opposite implication in URE and UMB. In URE, low types
should not contribute at all, and in UMB, they should contribute half as much as high types.
The application of the discussed fairness concepts considerably narrows down the set of
contribution norms that might emerge. However, only in the homogeneous case all concepts
lead to a coinciding focal norm. In heterogeneous groups the dierent conicting norms make it
impossible to tell theoretically which contribution norm will emerge, if a unique norm emerges at
all. In the next section we investigate empirically which norm emerges in the dierent treatments.
4 Experimental results
In this section we rst report the contributions to the public good in all treatments with and
without punishment. We concentrate on the behavior of high and low types and on whether
dierent types display dierent contribution patterns. Thereafter, we investigate econometrically
the enforcement of contribution norms through punishment.
94.1 Contribution rates
Without punishment, behavior in Equal shows the commonly-observed pattern of initially pos-
itive contributions that decrease over time. The Spearman rank-order correlation between mean
group contributions and periods is signicantly negative ( =  0:584, p  0:001). In each of the
unequal treatments, we observe a similar decreasing pattern for both low (   0:373, p  0:003)
and high types (   0:315, p  0:008).
Table 3 reports the average absolute contribution levels and average contributions relative
to endowments for all treatments divided by type. Since we are interested in how emerging
contribution norms might lead to persistent dierences in the behavior of high and low types,
we concentrate on the second half of the game to account for potential learning and experience
eects.13
Given that high types have twice the endowment of low types in URE and UUE, and a 50
percent higher marginal benet from the public good in UMB, it is reasonable to expect that
their absolute contributions will be higher than those of low types. Surprisingly, the descriptive
statistics for treatments without punishment (see rst two columns in Table 3) show only small
dierences in the average absolute contributions of the two types. This impression is corroborated
by statistical tests. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests do not nd that high types contribute signicantly
more than low types in any of the unequal treatments (one-sided tests, p > 0:118).14 Similarly,
Kruskal-Wallis tests comparing the contributions of each type across all treatments, cannot reject
the hypothesis that absolute contributions in all treatments are drawn from the same distribution
(low types: p = 0:374; high types: p = 0:711). Lastly, for all types in all treatments, behavior in
the last-period is very close to full free-riding.15
In summary, without punishment there are surprisingly little dierences in contributions
across the dierent types and treatments. Neither a 100 percent larger endowment nor a 50
percent higher benet from the public good by one group member leads to signicantly dierent
contributions. As in homogeneous groups, contributions in heterogeneous groups decrease over
13Descriptive statistics of average contributions for each period can be found in the online appendix
(http://www.ereuben.net/). There, we also provide a statistical analysis using data from all periods and pooling
across types.
14Given the similarity of average absolute contributions, it is evident that average relative contributions are
lower for high types than for low types in URE and UUE.
15The percentage of subjects that contributed two points or less in the last period are: Equal 85.71%, URE:
90.48%, UUE: 88.89%, and UMB 76.19%.
10Table 3: Average contributions
Note: Average contribution to the public good, by each type and treatment, in
absolute terms and relative to the endowment. Data correspond to the last ve
periods. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
without punishment with punishment
absolute relative absolute relative
low high low high low high low high
Equal 2.23 { 0.11 { 16.38 { 0.82 {
(2.11) { (0.11) { (4.02) { (0.20) {
URE 4.24 5.63 0.21 0.14 14.36 13.66 0.72 0.34
(2.52) (4.22) (0.13) (0.11) (5.47) (5.97) (0.27) (0.15)
UUE 5.18 4.10 0.26 0.10 15.32 28.27 0.77 0.71
(5.50) (4.29) (0.27) (0.11) (5.96) (11.53) (0.30) (0.29)
UMB 6.71 7.77 0.34 0.39 11.43 14.30 0.57 0.72
(5.08) (7.18) (0.25) (0.36) (5.46) (5.61) (0.27) (0.28)
time towards full free-riding. This shows that in these treatments, the emerging contribution
norm is independent of within-group heterogeneity and the contribution possibilities of the high
type. In particular, without punishment opportunities, in all treatments full free-riding emerges
as the prevalent behavior.
The introduction of punishment leads to a signicant increase in contributions. In the Equal
treatment, in the last ve periods, contributions are 14:15 points higher with punishment than
without punishment. Furthermore, with punishment, contributions do not show a statistically
signicant decreasing trend (Spearman's  = 0:248, p = 0:056).
In the unequal treatments, punishment has the same qualitative eect. However, the size of
the eect varies considerably across treatments and types (see Table 3, four rightmost columns).
For low types, the increase in contributions ranges from 10:13 points in UUE to only 4:72 points
in UMB. For high types, it ranges from 24:17 points in UUE to 6:53 points in UMB.16 It is also
the case that, with punishment, contributions do not display a statistically signicant decrease
by any type in any of the unequal treatments (low types:    0:042, p  0:728; high types:
16To test the statistical signicance of these increases we use Mann-Whitney U tests. As we have a clear
directional hypothesis, we use one-sided tests. We test separately each type and treatment using group averages
across the last ve periods as independent observations. The p-values for low types are: p = 0:001 for Equal,
p = 0:002 for URE, p = 0:012 for UUE, and p = 0:058 for UMB. The p-values for high types are: p = 0:009 for
URE, p = 0:003 for UUE, and p = 0:087 for UMB.
11   0:003; p  0:984).
Introducing punishment opportunities has a strong dierential eect on the contributions
of low and high types, with interesting dierences across treatments. In URE, low and high
types contribute almost the same amount in absolute terms (14:36 and 13:66 points on average).
Consequently, relative to their endowment, high types contribute only half as much as low types.
This stands in stark contrast to contribution levels of low and high types in UUE. There, the
mean absolute contribution of high types (28:27 points) is almost twice as high as that of low
types (15:32 points), implying that relative contributions are very similar (on average, 0:71 for
high types and 0:77 for low types). In UMB, we also observe a dierence in average contributions
between low and high types. High types contribute 14:30 points whereas low types contribute
only 11:43 points. Hence, high types contribute 25:11 percent more.17
The varying eect of punishment is also reected in a clear dierence in the behavior of high
types across treatments. Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null hypothesis that the contributions of
high types are drawn form the same distribution (p = 0:031 for absolute contributions and p =
0:032 for relative contributions). Pair-wise comparisons reveal that the absolute contributions of
high types in UUE, which are 28:27 points on average, are signicantly dierent from the absolute
contributions of high types in URE and UMB, which are on average 13:66 and 14:30 points,
respectively (two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests p  0:050).18 Analogously, relative contributions
are signicantly lower in the URE treatment when compared to UUE and UMB (two-sided Mann-
Whitney tests, p  0:050). In other words, punishment has the strongest eect on behavior of
high types in UUE. In this treatment high types contribute about six times more with punishment
than without punishment, whereas in the other two treatments there is `only' a two- to threefold
increase in contributions. In contrast, the contributions of low types are very similar across
all treatments (including the Equal treatment). For low types, a Kruskal-Wallis test does not
reject the null hypothesis that contributions come from the same distribution (p = 0:319).
In summary, in keeping with existing studies of homogeneous groups, punishment also in-
creases contributions and eliminates the decreasing trend in contributions in heterogeneous
17Using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests to see whether the absolute contributions of high types are signicantly
higher than those of low types gives the following p-values: p = 0:877 for URE, p = 0:014 for UUE, and p = 0:056
for UMB (one-sided tests). Applying the same tests to relative contributions gives: p = 0:018 for URE, p = 0:206
for UUE, and p = 0:116 for UMB (two-sided tests).
18Throughout the paper, whenever we carry out multiple pair-wise comparisons, we correct p-values using the
Benjamini-Hochberg method|which reduces the risk of false positives and controls for the rate of false negatives
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
12groups. Importantly, punishment induces recognizable quantitative dierences in the contribu-
tions of dierent types within and across treatments. In URE, where the maximum contribution
of high types is bound to be the same as that of low types, both types contribute equally in spite
of the fact that high types have twice the endowment of low types and that their contributions
are well below the maximum. In contrast, in UUE high types contribute twice as much as low
types, and in UMB they contribute about 25 percent more.
These results clearly suggest that subjects are following dierent contribution norms in the
dierent treatments. In URE contributions are consistent with a norm in which both types
contribute the same in absolute terms. In UUE, behavior is consistent with a norm in which
contributions dier and are proportional to the endowment. In UMB, contributions are roughly
in line with contributions being proportional to the relative marginal benets from the public
good (i.e., low types contribute 33 percent less). Note that all these norms, if applied to the
homogeneous case, imply that everyone should contribute the same amount. Given that in
treatments without punishment contributions are very similar across treatments and types, it is
likely that the dierences we observe in treatments with punishment are the result of dierences
in punishment behavior. In particular, subjects might be using punishment to enforce dierent
contribution norms in the dierent treatments. In the following section we explore precisely this
conjecture.
4.2 Punishment and the enforcement of heterogeneous norms
In homogeneous groups, given that everyone is in the same position, it is reasonable to assume
that when individuals decide who and how much to punish, they treat dierences in contribu-
tions of dierent people in the same way. In heterogeneous groups, it is harder to know a priori
how individuals compare dierences in contributions. In principle, one could assume a specic
motivation for punishment (e.g., equalize earnings) and then use it to make treatment compar-
isons. However, given the numerous ways interpersonal comparisons can be made (see Table 2)
and our limited knowledge of how subjects perceive contributions in heterogeneous situations,
we opt for a more exible empirical approach.
For our analysis, we only assume that subjects have some idea|based on a contribution
norm|about what the contribution of others compared to their own should be, and that at least
some subjects are willing to punish individuals who deviate from this contribution. This is a
relatively weak assumption that is consistent with existing evidence from experiments of public
13good games with punishment in homogeneous groups.19
We do not assume a specic contribution norm but elicit the norm that is most consistent
with the observed punishment data. More specically, we estimate the following model:
pijt = neg max[cit   (1   )cjt;0] + pos max[(1   )cjt   cit;0] + vi + ijt; (1)
where pijt is the amount of punishment that i allots to j in period t. The term  2 [0;1]
captures the norm of how much subjects expect others to contribute in comparison to their own
contribution. The rst term in the model corresponds to negative deviations from this relative
contribution norm. For example, if  = 0:50 and therefore 1    = 0:50 then the rst term
in (1) is positive whenever cjt < cit. In other words, subjects expect others to contribute as
much as they do, and if someone contributes less, they consider this to be a negative deviation.
Alternatively, if  = 0:75 and therefore 1    = 0:25 then subjects consider that a negative
deviation occurs when cjt < 3cit, which implies that subjects expect others to contribute three
times as much as they do. In the extremes, if  = 0, subjects expect to contribute everything
themselves and others to contribute nothing, and if  = 1, subjects expect to contribute nothing
themselves and others to contribute everything. The second term in (1) corresponds to positive
deviations, which are evaluated using the same . The variable vi captures unobserved individual
characteristics, and ijt is the error term.
To nd the value of  that best explains the data, we estimate (1) using values of  between
zero and one in steps of 0.01. For consistency reasons, we restrict the values of neg and pos
to be greater than or equal to zero. Given that punishment is bounded by zero and ten, we
use Tobit estimates. Furthermore, we treat the unobserved individual characteristics as random
eects. Lastly, we use punishment data from all periods (as opposed to only the last ve) because
punishment occurs more often at the beginning of the game, and it is then when contribution
norms should start to emerge.
In Equal, as subjects are in symmetric positions, we look for one value for . In the heteroge-
neous treatments, we distinguish between types and look for a value of  in each of the following
cases: low types punishing high types, low types punishing low types, and high types punishing
low types. This allows us to detect not only dierences in punishment across treatments, but
also between types. Below we present the results of the estimation just described.20
The relative ts of regressions for the various values of  in each treatment are depicted in
19For example, Herrmann et al. (2008) nd this pattern in sixteen dierent countries across the world. Other
examples include G achter and Herrmann (2007), Egas and Riedl (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), and Reuben and Riedl
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Figure 1: Goodness of t for dierent values of 
Note: Log likelihood obtained when estimating (1) for values of  2 [0;1]. The log likelihood
is normalized such that 0 equals the log likelihood of the worst tting regression and 1 that of
the best tting regression.
Figure 1. The gure shows, for values of  2 [0;1], the value of the log likelihood obtained when
estimating (1). For convenience and the sake of comparison, we normalized the log likelihood
such that 0 equals the log likelihood of a regression where we set neg = pos = 0 (i.e., only with
(2009).
20In order to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate (1) using the following variations: (i) adding
the period t and the total group contributions as additional independent variables, (ii) considering only subjects
who punish at least once, (iii) using Logit estimates and treating punishment as a binary decision (either punish or
not), and (iv) treating the unobserved individual characteristics vi as unconditional xed eects. These variations
give very similar results, which are available in the online appendix (http://www.ereuben.net/).
15the constant), and 1 equals the log likelihood of the regression with the value of  that gives the
best t. Henceforth, we refer to the  of the best-tting regression as . Furthermore, we use
a subscript to indicate the type of the punisher and punished (e.g., 
L!H indicates the case of
low types punishing high types).
In Equal, one can see that the t of the model has a clear maximum at the focal 
L!L = 0:50.
In other words, the best t is obtained for the  that implies that subjects punish those who
deviate from their own contribution. Moreover, deviations from this value of  monotonically
worsen the model's performance.
A unique global maximum of  is also observed for both types in the heterogeneous groups
treatments. In URE we nd that 
L!H = 
L!L = 
H!L. That is, low and high types
enforce on (other) low types the same contribution norm, and low types do not dierentiate
between types. For UUE and UMB, we nd that subjects do make a distinction between types
as 
L!H > 
L!L > 
H!L. Hence, subjects' punishment behavior reveals that they expect high
types to contribute more than low types, and judging from the dierences between the values of
, more so in the UUE treatment. To see this more clearly, we present in Table 4 the values of
 in each treatment|along with the estimated coecients of the corresponding regression.
In all treatments, 
L!L is very close to or exactly 0:50, which reveals that low types expect
other low types to contribute as much as they do, independent of the group heterogeneity. Dier-
ences between treatments occur when low types punish high types and vice versa. Remarkably,
in URE low types expect high types to contribute as much as they and other low types do since

L!L = 
L!H = 0:50. In UUE, in contrast, 
L!H = 0:65, which implies that low types expect
high types to contribute roughly twice as much as they do. Hence, it is the high types' capacity
to contribute more and not simply their higher endowment that makes low types demand that
high types contribute more than low types. In UMB, low types also demand that high types
contribute more but by a smaller amount: 
L!H = 0:56 translates into roughly 25 percent higher
contributions.
Consistent with the low types' contribution norm, high types in URE expect low types to
contribute as much as they do (i.e., 
H!L = 0:50). In contrast, in UUE, high types expect low
types to contribute less. In this treatment, in agreement with the low types' contribution norm,
a 
H!L = 0:33 indicates that high types expect low types to contribute roughly half of their
own contribution. The fact that in both URE and UUE high and low types enforce the same
contribution norm on each other indicates that there is consensus on what the contribution of
each type should be. In UMB the agreement seems somewhat weaker. 
H!L = 0:40 reveals
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17that high types expect low types to contribute 33 percent less than they do whereas low types
expect high types to contribute 25 percent more than they do. Interestingly, this implies that
the disagreement in contribution norms is in favor of high types; in the sense that high types ask
that their own relative contributions are higher than the low types actually enforce.
In principle, in addition to enforcing dierent contribution norms, subjects in dierent treat-
ments could dier in the severity with which they punish deviations from a given norm. We can
see whether this is the case by looking at the magnitude of the estimated coecients (available
in Table 4). Interestingly, negative deviations from the contribution norm are punished similarly
across treatments.21 This suggests that the motivation to punish negative deviations from a
contribution norm is largely independent of the exact norm and individuals' types.22
In summary, the observed dierences in contributions of high types in the dierent treatments
with punishment can be attributed to the informal enforcement of dierent contribution norms.
Interestingly, both high and low types largely agree on the norm that is enforced. Therefore, it
is not simply a matter of one type using punishment to coerce the other type towards higher
contributions. Of the possible contribution norms (see Table 2), the one that is actually enforced
depends on the form of heterogeneity. In URE, where low and high types face the same maximum
contribution, both types apply a norm consistent with equal contributions, despite the fact that
high types' earnings are (almost) twice as high as low types' earnings. In UUE, where high
types can contribute twice as much as low types, the enforced contributions are proportional
to endowments. This pattern suggests an equity based contribution norm where contributions
are proportional to the capacity to contribute. In UMB, with equal endowments but unequal
marginal benets from the public good, the enforcement behavior of high types is consistent with
a contribution norm that is proportional to the ratio of marginal benets.
21For example, if we test whether the coecient for negative deviations of each regression equals 1.01|which is
the value of the coecient of the Equal treatment|we cannot reject the null hypothesis in any of the regressions
(Wald tests, p  0:172).
22Unlike negative deviations, punishment of positive deviations from the contribution norm (so-called antisocial
punishment) is less common. It occurs under Equal and in the punishment of low types by high types in URE.
In fact, as can be seen in Table 4, in some cases the coecient for positive deviations is restricted to zero. In
regressions without this restriction, the coecient's value is close to zero in all cases and it is never statistically
signicant (p  0:467).
185 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence for the emergence and informal enforcement of dierent
contribution norms in public good games with homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We nd
that, in the absence of punishment, contributions steadily decline in all treatments, which results
in similar behavior in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. The trend towards free-riding
also dissipates potential dierences between individuals with dierent induced characteristics.
Indeed, the behavior that prevails in all treatments without punishment is full free-riding. In
stark contrast, when punishment is possible, contributions not only increase, but also exhibit
considerable dierences across treatments and between dierent types of individuals. We show
that the dierences in the individuals' contribution and sanctioning behavior are consistent with
the enforcement of dierent contribution norms.
In treatments with unequal endowments, we nd that the enforced contribution norm pre-
scribes contributions that are proportional to the maximum feasible contribution. This implies
that if contributions are bounded only by the size of the endowment (as in our treatment UUE),
subjects with large endowments (high types) are expected to contribute more than subjects with
small endowments (low types). At the same time, if the contribution possibilities are equal be-
tween types (as in our treatment URE) then both high and low types are expected to contribute
the same amount. In the treatment with unequal marginal benets from the public good (UMB),
we nd that the emerging norm prescribes contributions that are proportional to the ratio of
marginal benets. The identied contribution norms can be readily reconciled with ideas of
equality and equity regarding contributions to the public good. In contrast, notions of fairness
with respect to earnings fail to account for the dierences across and within treatments. This is
particularly evident from the relative earnings of high and low types in UUE and URE. Com-
pared to UUE, in URE low types earn considerably less than high types. Hence, contrasting the
ndings of Dawes et al. (2007), the enforced contribution norms are nonconsequentialist in the
sense of Elster (1989).
The emergence of dierent norms among dierent people in dierent environments has a silver
lining and a demerit. On the one hand, it shows that people are willing and able to informally
enforce norms in heterogeneous environments, and that, in spite of multiple and conicting focal
norms, they can tacitly agree on a unique contribution norm. This leads to relatively high
contributions to the public good in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. On the other
hand, it also shows that the contribution norm that is actually enforced may hinge on details of
19the environment, which may make it dicult to predict.
In this paper, we concentrate on the enforcement of one norm, which is based on deviations
from a subject's own contribution. Although this is in line with the common assumption in
the literature, it is conceivable that other fairness ideas might also be at play. In this case, the
question whether various norms are simultaneously enforced arises.23 A promising rst step in
this direction is set by the study of Carpenter and Matthews (2008), who aim at identifying
dierent types of norms in public good games with homogeneous groups. The investigation of
the simultaneous enforcement of multiple norms in heterogeneous groups could build on this
work, but calls for a much larger variation of treatments and considerably more data. We leave
this for future research.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies underscore the importance of norms in diverse areas
of the economy and society. On the empirical side, Kim et al. (2006) nd that norms of depart-
mental productivity strongly inuences the individual productivity of academics, and Goette
et al. (2006) report that group membership increases cooperation and the willingness to enforce
cooperative norms in platoons of the Swiss Army. Norms have been found to inuence behav-
ior even after individuals have moved across societies. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007)
show that norms strongly inuence illegal parking behavior of U.N. diplomats in New York, and
Guiso et al. (2006) demonstrate how the level of trust exhibited by decedents of immigrants to
the United States correlates with the level of trust of the country from which their ancestors
emigrated. On the theoretical side, Fischer and Huddart (2008) show that norms can put re-
strictions on optimal organizational design. Our study conrms that important dierences in
behavior between groups can be attributed to the informal enforcement of dierent norms, and
are not necessarily due to dierences in the preferences of group members. Moreover, we add to
this literature the insight that heterogeneity and subtle variations in the environment can shift
attention from one focal norm to another, resulting in considerably dierent outcomes.
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